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Low-cost Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are devices with very limited 
computational capability, in which only 250-4K logic gates can be devoted to security- 
related tasks. Classical cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers or hash functions 
are well beyond the computational capabilities of low-cost RFID tags, as ratified by the 
EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 RFID specification. Moreover, the Gen-2 RFID specification 
does not pay due attention to security. For this reason, an efficient Ultra Light Authenti-
cation Protocol (ULAP) is proposed in this paper. This new scheme offers an adequate 
security level against passive attacks, and is compliant with Gen-2 RFID specification.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Acceptance of RFID technology has not come as quickly as expected, even though 
its usage has recently started to blossom in many companies. An indication of this is the 
report published by IDtechEx where it is envisioned that ten billions tags will be used in 
2007, increasing to a trillion tags by 2015 [9]. One of the main problems of RFID tech-
nologies suffer and an obstacle to their success, is cost. Tag price should be in the range 
of 0.05-0.1 € to make it affordable in everyday packaging.  
With price being such a limiting factor (with implications for gate count for exam-
ple), using strong classic cryptographic primitives is unfeasible. For example, for a stan-
dard implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), between 20K and 30K 
gates are needed. Additionally, the memory incorporated in a tag is usually limited to a 
few hundred bits. Their processing capability (measured as the number of equivalent 
logic gates) is commonly assumed not to be higher than a few thousand gates, and in the 
case of passive tags a maximum of 4K gates can be devoted to security functions [44]. 
With regard to power source, tags can be categorized as active or passive. Passive tags, 
without an internal source of power, are the most commonly used, so their power con-
sumption should be very limited [22]. Furthermore, tags are not at all tamper resistant, so 
we must accept that tags are not able to store passwords securely. 
Nowadays we are in a convergence period between barcodes and RFID technology. 
While RFIDs are only used in particular situations now, an increase of up to 96% in their 
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usage scenarios is expected this year [49]. Experts believe that both systems will coexist 
for some time and that finally, RFID tags will completely replace classic barcodes [47]. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces RFID 
standards, focusing on the Gen-2 RFID specification. A short review of the main prob-
lems associated with RFID systems is outlined in section 3. In section 4, related work is 
presented. Section 5 proposes an Ultra Light Authentication Protocol (ULAP) compliant 
with the Gen-2 specification. A security evaluation and a performance analysis of this 
new protocol is presented in section 6. In section 7, the proposed architecture for imple-
menting our protocol is explained in detail. Finally, some concluding remarks are pre-
sented in section 8. 
2. RFID STANDARDS 
The benefits of standards are clear, and assumed by almost everyone. The growth of 
any new technology is in many cases due in part to the establishment of open standards. 
To foster and publicize RFID technology, several organizations including EPCglobal 
(which is a joint venture between EAN International and Uniform Code Council) and 
ISO have been actively working on RFID standardization [12, 20]. Table 1 summarizes 
the main standards linked to RFID technology. 
Back in 2003, there was a clear lack of harmonization and major RFID vendors of-
fered proprietary systems. Fortunately, things are changing rapidly. One of the most im-
portant standards proposed by EPCglobal is the EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 RFID 
specification (known as Gen-2 in short). This standard was adopted by EPCglobal in 
2004 and was sent to ISO. Eighteen months later (March-April 2006), it was ratified by 
ISO, and published as an amendment to its 18000-6 standard. In conclusion, at least for 
low-cost RFID tags, it seems that we are clearly moving closer to a universal standard. 
Although standards are increasingly adopted by many companies, some others base the 
security of the tags they manufacture on proprietary solutions. The use of proprietary 
solutions is not too bad if algorithms are published so they can be analyzed by the  
Table 1. RFID standards. 
scope Standards 
ISO 10536 Close-couple cards 
ISO 14443 Proximity cards Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards 
ISO15693 Vicinity cards 
ISO 14223 Advanced transponders 
ISO 11784 Code structure Animal  Identification 
ISO 11784 Technical concept 
ISO 18000-1 Reference architecture 
ISO 18000-(2-4) 135 KHz, 13,56 Mhz, 2,45 GHz Item  Management 
ISO 18000-(6-7) 860-960 MHz, 433 MHz 
UHF Class -1 
Generation-2 Electronic  Product Code 
ISO 18006-C 
EPC 
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research community. As time has shown, the security of an algorithm cannot reside in “its 
obscurity.” Texas Instruments DST tags [5] and Philips Mifare cards [26] are recent ex-
amples of this: companies should learn form past errors and make the algorithm of the 
cryptographic primitives as widely-known as possible.  
Although a rigorous analysis of the Gen-2 RFID specification [12] is out of the 
scope of this work, we briefly summarize its more relevant properties (we refer the 
reader to [42] where the specification is analyzed in depth): 
 
? Tags are passive, harvesting energy from the reader signal. Communications must there 
fore be initiated by readers.  
? Tags support on-chip a 16-bit Pseudo-Random Number Generator and a 16-bit Cyclic 
Redundancy Code.  
? Tags are not tamper resistant, so memory is insecure.  
? A 32-bit kill PIN is used to make the tag permanently unusable (i.e., tags can be killed 
at point of sale on purchase) and a 32-bit access PIN is used to access the tag’s memory 
(read/write).   
? Readers are assumed to have a secure connection to a back-end database. 
 
3. RISKS AND THREATS 
 
Every now and then RFID news items appear in the mass media, and a fair amount 
of these represent inaccurate reports about the possibilities for abuse of the technology. 
Wile alarm concerning privacy issues is completely legitimate, misinformation and hys-
teria should be avoided so as not to distort the future of RFID technology. 
As already predicted in 1991, one of the main problems that ubiquitous computing 
has to solve is privacy [54]. RFID technology is a pervasive technology, perhaps one of 
the most pervasive in history. Products labeled with insecure tags reveal sensitive infor-
mation when queried by readers. Usually, readers need not be authenticated and tags an-
swer in a transparent and indiscriminate way. As an example of the threat this could pose, 
consider the pharmaceutical sector where tagged medication is planned for the immediate 
future. Imagine that when you leave the pharmacy with a given drug − say an anti-de- 
pressive or AIDS treatment, an attacker standing at the door, equipped with a reader, 
could find out what medication you have bought. Similarly, wrong-doers equipped with 
tag readers could search people, pick out those with multiple tagged bank bills to rob, 
and at the same time know how much money they will stand to gain with each robbery. 
Moreover − even if we could assure that tag’s contents were secure − this does not 
mean that protection against tracking (violation of location privacy) is guaranteed. Tags 
usually answer the readers “hello” queries with the same identifier. Such predictable tag 
responses allow a third party to establish an association between a tag and its owner. 
Even where individual tags only contain product codes rather than an unique serial num-
ber, tracking could still be possible using assembly of tags (constellations) [52]. 
In addition to the threats mentioned above, some other security-related aspects must 
be considered. RFID technology operates over radio, so communication can be eaves-
dropped. In the reader-to-tag channel (forward channel) the reader broadcasts a strong 
signal, allowing its monitoring from a long distance. The signal transmitted by the tag-to- 
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reader (backward channel) is relatively weak, and it may be only monitored closed to the 
tag. Even if the communications are encrypted, traffic analysis is feasible, extracting in-
formation from the patterns of communication. In general, the outcome of this analysis 
improves as the number of observed messages increases. 
Tag memory is insecure, and susceptible to physical attacks that can reveal the con-
tents completely. As these physical attacks generally involve manipulating the tag with 
precision equipments, they are often carried out in laboratories. Probe attacks, material 
removal through shaped charges or water etching, radiation imprinting, circuit disruption 
and clock glitching are examples of these kind of attacks. Counterfeiting (modifying the 
identity of an item) usually involves some of these types of attacks. 
Denial of service is another important threat. Attackers could disrupt the normal op-
eration of tags and readers by jamming the RF channel. This attack consists of setting an 
active device to continuously broadcast radio signals into the channel. This is an inherent 
problem occurring in all the technologies that use radio as their communication channel. 
On the other hand, tags can be disabled, for example by cloaking a tag from readers. This 
attack must be prevented by means of traditional countermeasures such as cameras or 
security guards. 
4. RELATED WORK 
The major challenge faced when trying to provide security for low-cost RFID tags is 
their very limited computational capability, making them unable to perform the most 
basic cryptographic operations. Surprisingly, most of the proposed solutions are based on 
the use of hash functions. Since the work of Sarma [46] in 2002, there has been a huge 
number of solutions based on this idea [7, 10, 18, 38, 57]. Although this apparently con-
stitutes a good and secure approach, engineers face the nontrivial problem of imple-
menting cryptographic hash functions with only 250-4K gates [44]. In most of the pro-
posals, no explicit algorithms are suggested and finding one is not an easy issue, since 
traditional hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2) cannot be used [14]. In [58] we find a 
recent work on the implementation of a new hash function with a reduced number of 
gates, but although this proposal seems to be light enough to fit in a low-cost RFID tag, 
the security of the hash scheme is questionable. Furthermore, the above mentioned pro-
posals do not comply with the Gen-2 RFID specification, because hash functions are not 
supported on Gen-2 RFID tags.  
In 2003, and before the Gen-2 standard was proposed, some authors started to sug-
gest the use of non-cryptographic primitives. Although the derived protocols were Gen-2 
compliant, their security is weak. Vajda et al. proposed a set of extremely-lightweight 
challenge-response authentication algorithms [50]. These can be used for authenticating 
the tag, but they can easily be broken by a powerful adversary. Moreover, these algo-
rithms do not solve important problems such as reader-to-tag authentication or tracking 
(to name just a few). In [23], Juels proposed a solution based on the use of pseudonyms, 
without the use of hash functions. The RFID tag stores a short list of pseudonyms, rotat-
ing them and releasing a different one with each reader query. An adversary can, however, 
gather all the names on the list by querying the tag multiple times. To avoid this, after a 
number of authentication sessions the list of pseudonyms must be updated on a different 
out-of-band communication channel. 
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Following the approach started by Vajda and Juels, Peris et al. proposed in 2006 
some new lightweight protocols. Chronologically, M2AP [40] was the first proposal, fol-
lowed by EMAP [39] and LMAP [43]. All these protocols are based on the assumption 
that only simple operations are available on-tag. Although the protocols are different, the 
framework is similar. They can be divided into four main stages: tag identification, mu-
tual authentication, index-pseudonym and key updating. M2AP and LMAP use the bit-
wise or, and, xor and sum mod 2M operators. EMAP uses a similar set of operators, ex-
cluding the sum. Instead, a parity function has been added to increase the security level 
of the key update stage. This is why EMAP needs around 60% less logic gates when 
compared with the other proposals. On the other hand, EMAP has to perform a higher 
number of operations, which means it can produce around half the number of answers as 
the other two protocols. The gate count of LMAP and M2AP is very close, as both share 
the same set of operators. However, an important advantage that LMAP has over M2AP 
is that the communication overhead in the forward channel has been reduced, because 
only one submessage has to be sent. This reduction means an increment of around 15% 
in the number of the answers per second, and a reduction of the power consumption. Fi-
nally, some weaknesses of M2AP are identified and corrected in the LMAP protocol. 
LMAP can be considered an early version of ULAP, the protocol presented here, al-
though there are major differences between them, notably the update of the SessionIDS 
independently of the result (success/fail) of the authentication, and some important 
modifications in the key updating algorithm. 
Unfortunately, Gen-2 RFID specification does not pay due attention to security. That 
is why there have recently been many proposals to enhance the security of the standard. 
However, these schemes continue to demonstrate important security flaws. Juels sug-
gested a scheme to prevent cloned tags from impersonating legitimate tags [24]. However, 
his protocol neglected to take eavesdropping and privacy issues into consideration, and 
therefore it provides no protection against privacy invasion and secret information leak-
age [37]. Karthikeyan et al.’s proposal is based on the use of xor and matrix operations 
[27]. This scheme is not resistant to DoS and replay attacks, and tracking is also possible 
[6]. Another interesting work is Due et al., where only a PRNG and a CRC are used [37]. 
However, DoS attacks are also possible against this proposal, impersonated tags can not 
be identified, and forward privacy is not guaranteed [6]. In 2007, two protocols attempt-
ing to correct some of the security shortcomings of the EPC-C1G2 were proposed by 
Chien et al. [6] and Konidola et al. [28]. The first proposed scheme is based on a PRNG 
and a CRC and the second one uses a pad generation function. Later, Peris et al. [41] and 
Lim et al. [33] show important security vulnerabilities in both proposals. 
 
5. ULTRA LIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
 
As many other authors, we think the security of low-cost RFID tags can be greatly 
improved without the use of classic cryptographic primitives (i.e. block/stream ciphers, 
hash functions, etc.). We also believe that new protocols should take standards into ac-
count, in particular the Gen-2 RFID specification. An Ultra Light Authentication Protocol 
(ULAP), compliant with the Gen-2 specification, is proposed in this article (see Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1. ULAP protocol. 
 
5.1 Suppositions of the Model 
 
Our protocol is based on the usage of pseudonyms, specifically index-pseudonyms 
(IDSs), and the related session index-pseudonyms (SessionIDSs). An (L-bit length) IDS is 
a unique index of a table row where all the information about a tag is stored. The IDS is 
never sent through the channel, instead an L-bit SessionIDS is transmitted. Each tag has 
an associated key, which is divided into four L bits components (K = K1 || K2 || K3 || K4). 
As the IDS, SessionIDS and key (K) should be updated, we need 6L bits of rewritable 
memory (EEPROM or FRAM) in total. A ROM memory to store the L-bit static identifi-
cation number (ID) is also required.  
For the implementation of our protocol, all costly operations such as random-num- 
ber generation will be performed by the reader. On the other hand, as tags are very com-
putationally limited devices, only the simplest operations are available: bitwise xor (⊕), 
bitwise or (∨), and sum mod 2m (+). Multiplication can hardly be used, as it is quite a 
costly operation [34]. Although it would seem that this seriously limits the strength of the 
resulting protocol, there are other proposals in cryptography that obtain an adequate se-
curity level by composing very simple and efficient operations, such as Salsa20 [4], TEA 
[55] and XTEA [56]. Furthermore, it is interesting to remember that any boolean function 
can be implemented by using {AND, OR, NOT} or {NAND} gates [16]. 
As most low-cost tags are passive, the communication must be initiated by the 
reader. We also suppose that both the backward and forward channel can be passively 
listened by an attacker. Note that this assumption implies that the air channel cannot be 
actively manipulated by an adversary; we assume therefore that man-in-the-middle and 
other active attacks are not feasible [30]. Our protocol is not secure against active attacks 
(see section 6.1). Finally, we also assume that the communication channel between the 
reader and the database is secure. 
5.2 The Protocol 
We can split our protocol proposal in four main stages: tag identification, mutual au- 
thentication, index-pseudonym updating, and key updating. 
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5.2.1 Tag identification 
 
Before starting the mutual authentication, the reader has to identify the tag. In a first 
naive approximation, the following mechanism could seem appropriate: the reader sends 
a hello message to the tag, which answers by sending its current IDS. By means of this 
IDS, the authorized reader (and only he) will be able to access the tag’s secret key (K = 
K1 || K2 || K3 || K4), which is necessary to carry out the next authentication stage. After a 
successful authentication, both the reader and the tag update the IDS. In these conditions, 
however, tracking could be possible, since IDS updating is only accomplished after a 
successful mutual authentication. This suggests the importance of carrying out an IDS 
update each time the tag is interrogated, no matter if the protocol completion results in a 
successful or unsuccessful authentication. As mentioned in section 4, the most common 
solution for this is based on the use of a hash function. This solution has three problems: 
it exceeds the capabilities of low-cost RFID tags, it is non-compliant with the Gen-2 
specification and implies the necessity of an exhaustive search in the back-end database. 
To solve these problems the following mechanism is proposed: the reader sends a hello 
message concatenated with a random number (challenge) to the tag, and the tag answer 
will consist of a SessionIDS. The SessionIDS will be computed in the following way: 
 
SessionIDS = IDS 
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { 
SessionIDS = (SessionIDS >> 1) + SessionIDS + SessionIDS + challenge; } 
 
In order to obtain this SessionIDS update function, we used Genetic Programming 
[29] and the lil-gp library [1] for finding highly nonlinear functions. This was accom-
plished using the avalanche effect as the key component of the fitness function. In fact, 
an even more demanding property was used: the Strict Avalanche Criterion [15], mathe-
matically described by: 
1, | ( , ) 1, ( ( ), ( )) ( , ).
2
x y H x y H F x F y B n∀ = ≈                             (5) 
So, if F has the Strict Avalanche Criterion, the hamming distance between the output 
of a random input vector and one generated by randomly flipping one of its bits follows a  
binomial distribution with parameters n and 12 .  
To fix the length of the challenge, the following scenario is considered: imagine that 
an attacker is eavesdropping the answers provided by a tag over one week, and the tag 
provides 500 answers/second, which is quite beyond current commercial rates. Under 
these conditions, the tag would generate around 223 SessionIDSs, so we suggest setting 
the length of challenges to 32-bits. 
We have used a technique named linear cryptanalysis (commonly used for block 
cipher cryptanalysis) to examine wether the SessionIDS update function can be approxi-
mated by a linear relation. In order to obtain a linear bias, the following experiment is 
carried out: two 32-bit masks (A, B) are randomly picked, and two consecutive outputs 
are generated (Oi, Oi+1). With these two masks, the equality A * Oi = B * Oi+1 is evaluated. 
This process is repeated 2n times, computing the numbers of successes (m). The * sym-
P. PERIS-LOPEZ, J. C. HERNANDEZ-CASTRO, J. M. ESTEVEZ-TAPIADOR AND A. RIBAGORDA 
 
40 
 
bolizes a scalar product, but a mod 2 operation is carried out after the addition. The bias 
is defined as: 
1
2 22
log (| |)
1 .
2
m
n
bias − −=                                                 (6) 
Due to the high computational cost of bias estimation, the length of variables are 
fixed to 32-bits. Instead of picking a random number for the challenge in each simulation, 
once the challenge is randomly initialized it will be incremental updated (challenge + 1, 
challenge + 2, challenge + 3, etc.) in order to consider a partial advantageous scenario. 
Many pairs of different masks, A and B, have been randomly tested. After a random ini-
tialization of the IDS and the challenge value (obtained from http://random.org), and for 
each mask pair, 225 32-bits outputs are generated, and the expression A * Oi = B * Oi+1 is 
evaluated over them. From the calculations described above, we can deduce that the bias  
of the SessionIDS update function (L = 32) is bounded by 14.56
1
2
.  
The serial correlation coefficient (autocorrelation) has also been studied, to measure 
the extent to which a new SessionIDS depended upon the previous SessionIDSs value. 
For that, the following experiment is implemented: the IDS and the challenge are ran-
domly initialized, obtained from http://random.org. After this initialization, 216 Session- 
IDS are computed. As in bias estimation, after the random initialization of the challenge, 
it is incrementally updated. The experiment is repeated five times, counting in each case 
the autocorrelation coefficient at bit, byte, and 4-byte levels over the obtained Session- 
IDS. Table 2 summarizes the observed results, showing that the new SessionIDS update 
function has very good properties. 
Table 2. Serial correlation test. 
 SessionIDS 
Experiment Bit Byte 4-Byte 
1-Experiment 0.00931 0.001033 0.005278 
2-Experiment 0.001104 0.003032 0.006295 
3-Experiment − 0.000198 − 0.000122 0.007116 
4-Experiment 0.001257 − 0.002537 0.009762 
5-Experiment 0.000435 0.002272 0.005875 
 
The use of the SessionIDS update function resolves the three connected problems 
found in schemes based on hash functions:  
 
1. Simple operations have been ratified by Gen-2 specification, thus guaranteeing the 
conformance of ULAP protocol with the standard.  
2. Simple operations are not highly demanding in terms of resources. Implementation 
can therefore be initiated realistically, without exceeding the limited resources of 
low-cost RFID tags.  
3. A linear search (f(x, challenge)) is accomplished in the database each time a tag is read. 
The function f symbolizes the SessionIDS update function. 
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In this way, each time a tag is interrogated by a reader, it will answer with a fresh 
SessionIDS. As described in section 5.2.3, once a mutual authentication has been suc-
cessfully accomplished, the IDS will be updated. For example, suppose that the tag (A) is 
interrogated twice by an attacker (D), before an authorized reader (R) interrogates it, and 
the attacker then again interrogates the tag. In this scenario the following messages will 
be transmitted: 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(D) -> (A): “hello” || challenge 
(A) -> (D): *SessionIDS 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(D) -> (A): “hello” challenge′ 
(A) -> (D): *SessionIDS′  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(R) -> (A): “hello” || challenge′′  
(A) -> (R): *SessionIDS′′ 
Mutual Authentication … 
Update(IDS) = IDS′  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(D) -> (A): “hello” || challenge′′′  
(A) -> (D): **SessionIDS′′′  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* SessionIDS = IDS 
for (i = 0 ; i < 32; i++) {  
SessionIDS = (SessionIDS >> 1) + SessionIDS + SessionIDS + challenge; } 
** SessionIDS = IDS′ 
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {  
SessionIDS = (SessionIDS >> 1) + SessionIDS + SessionIDS + challenge; } 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.2.2 Mutual authentication 
This phase of our protocol consists of the exchange of two messages between the 
reader and tag. The protocol works as follows: 
1. Reader Authentication  The reader will generate two nonces n1 and n2. With n1 
and subkeys K1 and K2 the reader will generate submessages A and B. With n2 and K3, 
it will generate submessage C. 
2. Tag Authentication  With submessages A and B, the tag will authenticate the reader 
and obtain n1. From submessage C, the tag will obtain the random number n2. Nonces 
n1 and n2 will be used in the IDS and key (K = K1 || K2 || K3 || K4) updating. Once 
these verifications are performed, the tag will generate the answer message D to au-
thenticate and send its static identifier securely.  
 
To evaluate the protocol, the following experiment was carried out: IDS, challenge, 
and K = K1 || K2 || K3 || K4 are randomly initialized with values from http://ramdom.org. 
After the initialization, 225 executions of the protocol are simulated (tag identification,  
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Table 3. Message sequence analysis (ENT, DIEHARD and NIST). 
 A B C D 
Entropy 
(bits/byte) 7.999999 7.999999 7.999999 7.999999 
Compression 
Rate 0% 0% 0% 0% 
X2 Statistic 253.50 (50%) 247.10 (50%) 246.90 (50%) 255.94 (50%) 
Arithmetic 
Mean 127.5054 127.4977 127.4901 127.5035 
Monte Carlo π 
Estimation 3.1413 (0.01%) 3.1419 (0.01%) 3.1414 (0.01%) 3.1414 (0.01%) 
− 0.000145 (byte) 0.000094 (byte) 0.000009 (byte) 0.000113 (byte) Serial Correlation 
Coefficient − 0.000040 (4-byte) 0.0000980 (4-byte) − 0.000398 (4-byte) 0.0003921 (4-byte) 
Diehard Battery 
(Overall p-value) 0.943171 0.569317 0.267451 0.851599 
NIST Battery √ √ √ √ 
 
mutual-authentication, index-pseudonym and key update), storing the submessages sent 
by the channel (A, B, C, D) in a file. In each simulation, the challenge is incrementally 
updated (disadvantageous scenario) in spite of the fact that it should be a random number, 
and the nonces n1 and n2 are randomly picked. The statistical properties of these four 
submessages have been analyzed with three well-known suites of randomness tests, 
namely ENT [51], DIEHARD [35] and NIST [48]. The results are summarized in Table 3. 
Due to the huge amount of p-values generated by the NIST statistical battery, the report 
is not shown here.1 Results indicate that messages are not easily distinguished from a 
random source, not even for the eavesdropper/cryptanalyst. 
We have put particular emphasis on the security and statistical properties of sub-
message D, since it is in this that the tag sends its more valuable information: the static 
identification number − ID. As shown in Eq. (4), message D uses an xor of two nonces 
(n1, n2) sent by the reader to disguise the information. 
To complete the analysis we will examine how an eavesdropper might obtain ad-
vantage by listening to previous communications between a reader and a tag. For this 
purpose, the bit-byte prediction test of David Sexton’s battery has been employed [2]. 
Specifically, various algorithms are used to predict the value of each bit (byte) from the 
beginning of the sequence to the end. In a random sequence the probability of success of 
any algorithm is 1/2 (respectively 1/256). The number of successes is counted and a chi- 
squared statistic is computed. The following tests have been carried out: 
 
? Bit Prediction A Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in all the previous bits are counted. 
If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a 
one is predicted. Otherwise the prediction is the same as for the previous bit. 
? Bit Prediction B Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the previous 9 bits are counted. 
If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a 
one is predicted. 
? Bit Prediction C Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the previous 17 bits are 
counted. If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero is predicted; if the zeros outnumber 
1 The whole report is available in http://163.117.149.208/pperis/ulap/. 
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the ones, a one is predicted. 
? Bit Prediction D Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the previous 33 bits are 
counted. If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero is predicted; if the zeros outnumber 
the ones, a one is predicted. 
? Bit Prediction E Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the previous 65 bits are counted. 
If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a 
one is predicted. 
? Byte Prediction A Test: the next byte is predicted to be equal to all the previous bytes 
bitwise XORed together. The first byte of the sequence is predicted to equal zero. 
? Byte Prediction B Test: the next byte is predicted to be equal to the sum of all the pre-
vious bytes, modulo 256. The first byte of the sequence is predicted to equal zero. 
? Byte Prediction C Test: the next byte value is predicted to be zero until the first zero is 
found. From that point on, the next byte value is predicted to be the byte value whose 
last appearance was furthest back in the sequence. 
? Byte Prediction D Test: a given byte value is predicted to be followed by the same byte 
value it was followed by the last time it appeared in the sequence. A byte value that has 
not previously appeared in the sequence is predicted to be followed by the byte value 
of the first byte in the sequence. The first byte of the sequence is predicted to equal 
zero. 
? Byte Repetition Test: This test is equivalent to a byte prediction test where each byte is 
predicted to be equal to its preceding byte. The first byte of the sequence is predicted to 
equal the last byte of the sequence. 
 
Under the aforementioned conditions, 232 executions of the protocol were executed 
to generate data for Sexton’s random batteries. The results obtained from these analyses 
are summarized in Table 4. Prediction analysis does indicate that the exchanged mes-
sages can be predicted significantly better than just by knowledge of the prior protocol 
executions without acquaintance with the IDS, K, and ID. 
As mentioned in section 3, one of the main security problems that RFID technol-
ogy must solve is tracking, or the violation of location privacy. Even if tag answers are 
not predictable, a slight relation between consecutive answers could help the attacker. 
Table 3 shows the autocorrelation coefficient at byte and 4-byte level. Additionally, the  
Table 4. Bit-byte prediction tests of David Sexton’s battery. 
 A B C D 
Bit Prediction A Statistic 0.1029 0.6287 0.8053 0.1737 
Bit Prediction B Statistic 0.3144 0.2104 0.9050 0.1898 
Bit Prediction C Statistic 0.2844 0.3111 0.2210 0.8481 
Bit Prediction C Statistic 0.8706 0.5648 0.1164 0.4428 
Bit Prediction E Statistic 0.8979 0.5868 0.5702 0.6794 
Byte Prediction A Statistic 0.6523 0.3045 0.1670 0.8995 
Byte Prediction B Statistic 0.3612 0.7907 0.2883 0.9126 
Byte Prediction C Statistic 0.8215 0.2178 0.2302 0.1838 
Byte Prediction D Statistic 0.1411 0.8353 0.9312 0.1075 
Byte Prediction E Statistic 0.5527 0.6221 0.7480 0.6738 
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Table 5. Correlation coefficient between K and IDS. 
 A B C D 
A − − 0.004964 0.005054 0.002706 
B − 0.004964 − 0.004221 − 0.001973 
C 0.005054 0.004221 − − 0.004059 
D 0.002706 − 0.001973 − 0.004059 − 
 
correlation coefficient is computed to determine the relation between different submes-
sages (X − Y). Results are presented in Table 5. From the results obtained, there is no 
evidence of relation between different submessages. 
 
5.2.3 Index-pseudonym and key updating 
 
After the mutual authentication phase, our protocol prescribes an index-pseudonym 
and key updating stage. Again, this should be carried out using only very efficient opera-
tions (⊕, ∨, and sum mod 2m). As all these operations have already been implemented in 
the tag for the previous protocol stages, its will not imply an increase in the gate count. 
Nevertheless, we should take into account the temporary requirements to ensure an ade-
quate answer ratio. Considering all these constraints, the equations for the index-pseu- 
donym and key updating phase are the following:  
( 1) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ( 2 4 )) ,
n n n
tag itag i tag i tag iIDS IDS n K ID
+ = + ⊕ ⊕                          (7) 
( 1) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 ( 3 ),
n n n
tag itag i tag i tag iK K n K ID
+ = ⊕ ⊕ ⊕                             (8) 
( 1) ( )
( )( ) ( )2 2 2 ,
n n
tag itag i tag iK K n ID
+ = ⊕ ⊕                                     (9) 
( 1) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )3 ( 3 1) ( 1 ),
n n n
tag itag i tag i tag iK K n K ID
+ = ⊕ + ⊕                           (10) 
( 1) ( )
( )( ) ( )4 ( 4 1) .
n n
tag itag i tag iK K n ID
+ = ⊕ +                                    (11) 
The analysis done on the statistical properties of the output of these four subkey 
updating sequences show good behavior, something that is hardly surprising as an xor 
with a nonce (n1 or n2) is performed in each. 
On the other hand, in the index-pseudonym update, we have used a sum instead of 
an xor operation, so we have no guarantees of good statistical properties and we should 
analyze its output. Under the same initialization conditions used to analyze the mutual- 
authentication stage, 225 updates of the IDS were simulated, storing the resulting values 
in a file. Table 6 shows the obtained results. The whole report is also available in http://163. 
117.149.208/pperis/ulap/. From these results, we can conclude that there is no evidence 
of the resulting IDS being significantly different from a random variable. 
An additional study has been performed to show that the relation between consecu-
tive index-pseudonyms (IDS) or keys (Ki) is negligible. Tables 6-8 show the autocorrela-
tion and correlation coefficient respectively, for these variables. In view of the results, it 
is not possible to infer any signs of dependence between these variables.  
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Table 6. IDS analysis. 
 IDS 
Entropy (bits/byte) 7.999999 
Compression Rate 0% 
X2 Statistic 251.75 (50%)
Arithmetic Mean 127.4930 
Monte Carlo π Estimation 3.1417 
0.000078 Serial Correlation 
Coefficient 0.000393 
Diehard Battery 
(Overall p-value) 0.619483 
NIST Battery √  
 Table 7. Serial correlation coefficient − K. 
 Serial Corr. (byte) Serial Corr. (4-byte) 
k1 − 0.000286 − 0.003269 
k2 0.000472 0.004281 
k3 0.000592 0.000592 
k4 0.000112 0.003935  
 
Table 8. Correlation coefficient between K and IDS. 
 k1 k2 k3 k4 IDS 
k1 − − 0.004246 0.001400 − 0.002992 0.001578 
k2 − 0.004246 − − 0.000806 0.004388 − 0.000200 
k3 0.001400 − 0.000806 − − 0.000520 − 0.001907 
k4 − 0.002992 0.004388 − 0.000520 − − 0.000552 
IDS 0.001578 − 0.000200 − 0.001907 − 0.000552 − 
Table 9. Bit-byte prediction tests of David sexton’s battery. 
 k1 k2 k3 k4 
Bit Prediction A Statistic 0.5851 0.6649 0.8915 0.1137 
Bit Prediction B Statistic 0.7729 0.7194 0.6326 0.4167 
Bit Prediction C Statistic 0.7775 0.1012 0.8077 0.6562 
Bit Prediction C Statistic 0.4677 0.1834 0.6672 0.7069 
Bit Prediction E Statistic 0.5146 0.1374 0.8718 0.8279 
Byte Prediction A Statistic 0.5353 0.8930 0.9307 0.7516 
Byte Prediction B Statistic 0.1310 0.2657 0.1103 0.2303 
Byte Prediction C Statistic 0.4930 0.5000 0.3021 0.6024 
Byte Prediction D Statistic 0.1815 0.1147 0.6374 0.1852 
Byte Prediction E Statistic 0.5868 0.8161 0.8209 0.2562 
 
Although the key (K = K1 || K2 || K3 || K4) is not sent in clear over the channel, and as 
tags are not tamper resistant, if the attacker has physical access to the tag, keys might be 
obtained. The bit-byte prediction tests of David Sexton’s battery have been computed [2] 
in order to study if the (IDS) or keys (Ki) can be easily derived from other (previous or 
past) occurrences. Much as in the analysis of the submessage sequences (mutual-authen- 
tication stage) and under the same conditions, 232 executions of the index-pseudonym 
and key update are completed. The results of the analysis, shown in Table 9, do not iden-
tify any significant advantage for the attacker. 
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6. EVALUATION 
 
6.1 Security Needs 
 
As any other mission-critical system, it is important to minimize the threats to con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) in data and computing resources. These three 
factors are often refereed to as “The Big Three.” However, not all systems need the same 
security level. For example, not all systems need 99,999% availability or require that 
users be authenticated via retinal scans. Because this, it is necessary to analyze and 
evaluate each system (data sensitivity, loss potential due to incidents, criticality of the 
mission, etc.) to determine the confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements. 
Therefore, although from a theoretical viewpoint active attacks might be considered, 
not all system must provide resistance to this kind of attack. In the RFID context, the 
security level of a high-cost tag used in e-passports should not equal that of a low-cost 
tag employed in supply chain (i.e. tags compliant to Gen-2). Table 10 summarizes the 
specifications that are realistic with a current low-cost RFID tag and an e-passport (high- 
cost tag). 
 
Table 10. Specifications for a low-cost and a high-cost RFID tags. 
 Low-cost RFID Tag High-cost RFID tag 
Standards EPC Class-1 Generation-2 ISO/IEC 18006-C ISO/ICE 14443 A/B 
Power Source Passively powered Passively powered 
Storage 32 - 1K bits 32 KB – 70 KB 
Circuitry 
(security processing) 
250 – 4K gates 
Standard cryptographic 
primitives cannot be supported
Microprocessor Implement 
3DES, SHA-1, RSA 
Reading distance 
(commercial devices) Up to 3m Around 10 cm 
Price 0.05 – 0.1 € Several euros 
Physical attacks Not resistant Tamper resistant EAL 5+ security level 
Resistance to passive attacks Yes Yes 
Resistance to active attacks 
[8, 25, 27, 30, 37] No Yes 
 
6.2 Security Analysis 
 
Complementing the statistical study of the exchanged messages shown above, a 
more detailed security analysis is presented below. Although a formal analysis is possible, 
it is common practice when a new protocol is presented [6, 10, 23, 37, 38, 50] to analyze 
its security against the most relevant attacks, as done here. For each attack, we describe it 
then show the ULAP defense against it. 
 
1. User Data Confidentiality  The tag ID must be kept secure to guarantee the user’s  
privacy. The tag sends message D ( ) ( )( )( ( ) 1 2)
n
tag itag iD SessionIDS ID n n= + ⊕ ⊕  thus  
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hiding the tag ID to any eavesdropper equipped with an RFID reader. 
2. Tag Anonymity  The location privacy of tag holders can be revealed even when the 
information on the tag is securely protected. For example, if the messages sent by the 
tag are well encrypted, the leakage of information is not possible. However, as the tag 
answers are constant, a tag could be easily associated with its holder. Specifically, lo-
cation privacy can be more significant when a certain tag is exposed to long-term 
tracking [21]. It is therefore crucial to make all the information sent by the tag anony-
mous. This property is guaranteed in all phases of the protocol by generating new Ses-
sionIDSs in each session.  
As seen in section 5.2.1, tags always send a fresh SesionIDS, which is obtained by 
means of a SessionIDS update function with a high avalanche-effect. This property 
prevents successive tag answers from disclosing any kind of information. In the mu-
tual-authentication stage tags have to send their static identifier ID and other addi-
tional information to accomplish the tag-to-reader authentication. To avoid tracking, 
all the exchanged messages should be sent in seemingly random wraps (i.e. to an 
eavesdropper, random numbers are sent). As we have seen, the reader generates the 
message A || B || C. This message serves to authenticate him, as well as to transmit 
nonces n1 and n2 to the tag securely. These two nonces will be used to hide tag ID, as 
well as to update the index-pseudonym and the associated key.  
By means of these two mechanisms, we are able to put most of the computational load 
on the reader side. Tag anonymity is thus guaranteed and privacy location of the tag 
owner is not compromised. 
3. Data Integrity  A portion of the tag’s memory is rewritable, so modifications are 
possible. In this part of the memory, the tag stores the index-pseudonym (IDS), session 
index-pseudonym (SessionIDS) and its key (K). If an attacker does succeed in modi-
fying this part of the memory, the reader will not recognize the tag (and should im-
plement an update protocol on the database). 
Furthermore, as we mentioned in sections 3 and 6.1, low-cost tags are not tamper re-
sistant. So this kind of tag is susceptible to physical attacks, with the resulting revela-
tion of their content.  
4. Mutual Authentication  We have designed the protocol with both reader-to-tag au-
thentication (message A || B || C) and tag-to-reader authentication (message D). 
5. Forward Security  Forward security is the property that guarantees that the security 
of messages sent today will be valid tomorrow [38]. Since the key updating is fulfilled 
after the mutual authentication, a security breach of an RFID tag will not reveal data 
previously transmitted. 
6. Replay Attack Prevention  An eavesdropper could store all the messages exchanged 
between the reader and the tag (from different protocol runs). Then he could try to 
impersonate a reader, re-sending the message A || B || C seen in any of the previous pro-
tocol runs. It may seem that this could cause loss of synchronization between the da-
tabase and the tag, but this is not the case because after a protocol execution, a new 
SessionIDS will be used. Additionally, if the authentication is successful, the index- 
pseudonym (IDS) and the key K (K = K1 || K2 || K3 || K4) will be updated. 
7. Forgery Resistance  The information stored in the tag is sent disguised (⊕, ∨, and +) 
with nonces (n1, n2). Straightforward copying of information of the tag by eavesdrop-
ping is therefore not possible. 
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Additionally, our protocol is secure against the “skimming” attack described by Juels 
[24]. In this attack, an attacker scans the exchanged messages between an authorized 
reader and a tag. Then these messages sent by the tag, in our case SessionIDS and D, 
are stored in a fake RFID tag. The attacker would wish to pretend this were the legiti-
mate tag. However, each time a tag is read, a new SessionIDS is computed. The Ses-
sionIDS is used in the answer of the hello || challenge message and in the D message. 
So the reader will see that these messages are a replay. In fact, the protocol will be 
stopped when the replay SessionIDS message is sent. 
8. Data Recovery  The interception or blocking of messages is a DoS attack preventing 
tag identification. As we do not consider these attacks a serious problem for very low- 
cost RFID tags, our protocol does not particularly focus on providing data recovery. 
9. Active Attacks  As mentioned in section 5.1, we assume that the attacker is unable to 
perform man-in-the-middle attacks. ULAP can then be implemented in low-cost RFID 
tags and provides defense against a great number of attacks, excluding active attacks. 
A detailed explanation justifying this assumption is found in section 6.1. 
In [31, 32], the security of the ultra lightweight MAP protocols family proposed by 
Peris et al. (M2AP, EMAP, LMAP) have been recently analyzed . First, a desynchro-
nization attack is proposed. This attack is based on a man-in-the-middle; an attacker 
intercepts the answer provided by the reader and alters the message content (i.e. flip-
ping one bit of the submessages sent). Then the answer backscattered by the tag is 
modified in the same way. This attack can be accomplished on A and/or B and/or C 
submessages. Secondly, a full-disclosure attack which enables an attacker to disclose 
tag ID is proposed. However, this attack can not be applied to ULAP. The above at-
tacker consists on listening to several authentication sessions with the same IDS. In 
the proposed scheme, when an attacker interacts with a tag (tag identification + tag 
authentication) and independently of whether authentication is successful, a new Ses-
sionIDS is employed, frustrating the attack. Additionally, the attack assumes that an 
attacker can run the in-complete protocol many times, which is an incorrect assump-
tion. In [19], a more efficient full-disclosure attack is proposed. As the attack is based 
on the same assumptions as Li et al.’s attack, it is not feasible against ULAP either.  
Table 11 shows a comparison of the security requirements of different proposals in 
the literature. We have added our proposal (ULAP) in the last column.  
The departure point for this analysis is Avoine’s work, who proposed an adversary 
model suitable for RFID environments where existential and universal untraceability are 
defined [3]. As we have seen in the security analysis, the information sent by the tag 
gives no useful information to an attacker. The reader sends no useful information either. 
Consequently, ULAP is Existential-UNT-QSE according to Avoine’s classification. By 
tampering with the tag, an attacker can obtain its current index-pseudonym, SessionIDS, 
and key, but he can not track the tag’s past events because the key and index-pseudonym 
is updated after each mutual authentication. ULAP is therefore Forward-UNT-QSER. 
6.3 Performance Analysis 
It is important to carefully analyze the performance of the proposed scheme in order 
to show that it can be implemented even in very low-cost tags, such as tags conforming 
to the Gen-2 specification. Computation, storage, and communication overheads will be 
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Table 11. Security analysis. 
Protocol HLS [53]
EHLS 
[53]
EHC 
[38]
PSL 
[36]
SA 
[13]
HBVI 
[18]
MAP 
[57] ULAP 
User Data Confidentiality × △ ○ ○ ○ △ ○ ○ 
Tag Anonymity × △ ○ ○ △ △ ○ ○ 
Data Integrity △ △ △ △ △ ○ ○ △ 
Mutual Authentication △ △ △ ○ △ △ ○ ○ 
Forward Security △ △ ○ × × ○ ○ ○ 
Replay Attack △ △ △ ○ △ ○ ○ ○ 
Forgery Resistance × × ○ ○ ○ △ ○ ○ 
Data Recovery × × × × × ○ ○ × 
Notation: ○ Satisfied  △ Partially Satisfied  × Not Satisfied 
Table 12. Computational loads and required memory. 
 
Notation: ¬ Not Required  Nt: Number of Tags  L: Size of Required Memory   
1 Basic Operations: ⊕, ∨ and + (sum mod 2m)  2 SessionIDS Update Function 
analyzed. Additionally, a comparison of the performance of different proposals in the 
literature, including ULAP protocol, is shown in Table 12. 
 
1. Computation Overhead  Classic cipher algorithms or hash functions are well be-
yond the capability of low-cost RFID tags, as explicitly stated in the Gen-2 RFID 
specification. Additionally, one of the main drawbacks of hash-based solutions is that 
the load (for tag identification) on the server side (reader and back-end database) is 
proportional to the number of tags. In our proposal, this problem has been completely 
solved by using a SessionIDS that allows a tag to be unequivocally identified and its 
data directly accessed in the database. The SessionIDS (SessionIDs = f(IDS, challenge)) 
is obtained by means of a very efficient function which only uses simple operations, 
allowing its implementation in low-cost tags. As we see in section 5.2.1, the reader 
sends a challenge (hello || challenge) and the tag answers a SessionIDS, thus prevent-
ing an exhaustive search in the back-end database. 
2. Storage Overhead  We assume that all components are L-bit sized, that the hash 
function and the RNG are h, hk: {0, 1} → {0, 1}(1/2)L and r ∈U {0, 1}L. Our protocol is 
based on L-bit session index-pseudonym (SessionIDS), L-bit index-pseudonym (IDS) 
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and an associated key of length 4L, which is used for mutual authentication between 
the reader and the tag. Moreover, the tag has to store a unique identification number 
(ID) of length L. Both the reader and the tag have to store this information, so they 
require a memory of 7L bits. 
3. Communication Overhead  The proposed protocol accomplishes mutual authenti-
cation between the tag (T) and the reader (R + B), requiring only four rounds. Many 
other protocols require at least one or two additional messages. In the Ohkubo [38] 
and Feldhofer [13] protocols, only two messages are exchanged, but a mutual authen-
tication is not accomplished with subsequent security problems. Molnar’s protocol can 
be thought to be more efficient as only three messages are used [36]. However, in this 
protocol tags should be equipped with a pseudo-random number generator and a 
keyed hash function, which is far beyond the capabilities of low-cost RFID tags. 
Taking into account that low-cost tags are passive and that communication can only be 
initiated by a reader, four rounds may be considered a reasonable number for mutual 
authentication in RFID environments. 
7. IMPLEMENTATION 
It is a common assumption that between 50-100 tags at least should be authenticated 
per second [45]. As in [13], due to the low-power restrictions of RFID tags, the clock 
frequency must be set to 100 KHz. So a tag may use up 2000 clock cycles at the most to 
answer a reader. Because of these characteristics, it is not necessary to resort to a parallel 
implementation. As shown in Fig. 2, we have decided not to process all the message at 
the same time, but in m-bit blocks. 
L is set to 96-bits, which is a length compatible with all the encoding schemes 
(GTIN, SSCC, GLN, GRAI, GIAI, GID) defined by the EPC [12]. The proposed archi-
tecture is, however, independent of the word length used. We have analyzed the features 
of four different word lengths (m = 8, 16, 32, 96). In Fig. 2 we can see a logic scheme of 
the proposed architecture and the logical memory map conforming to Gen-2 RFID speci-
fication.  
To the left, the memory is shown filled with the index-pseudonym (IDS), the session 
index-pseudonym (SessionIDS), the key K (K1 || K2 || K3 || K4), and the ID. Memory ac-
cess is controlled by a sequencer. Since messages consist of three or more components, 
we will need an m-bit register to store intermediate results (register_1). In the middle of 
the figure we have the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU). This unit will make the following 
m-bit word length operation: bitwise xor (⊕), bitwise or (∨), and sum mod 2m (+). The 
ALU has two inputs, each one selected by means of a multiplexor. The first input is se-
lected (signal c_3) between the values stored in the memory, and the internal state of the 
SessionIDS update function (register_2). By means of the signal c_4 the second input is 
selected, consisting of the bitstream or the value stored in the auxiliary register_1. The 
control signal c_2 will select the operation that will be used in the ALU. 
The SessionIDS update function is implemented with the same simple operations as 
in mutual authentication, so this function will use the ALU. As the new SessionIDS is 
obtained after 32 rounds, a new auxiliary register (resister_2) is necessary to store the 
results of each round. The signal c_1 controls the initialization of this function (Session- 
IDS = IDS). 
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Fig. 2. Logic scheme and logical memory map. 
 
Around 85% of all clock cycles needed to implement the four stages of the protocol 
are consumed by the SessionIDS update function. In spite of this, the total number of 
cycles employed is below the limit of 2000 cycles, considering that the clock frequency 
is set to 100KHz. Although in the case of m = 8 bits we are near the inferior limit (50 
answers/sec), in the rest of cases the temporary requirements are accomplished with a 
relative high margin, for example in the 32-bit architecture a tag is able to provide 180 
answers/sec. So the temporary requirements are fulfilled in all scenarios. 
Another important aspect to consider is the number of logical gates necessary for 
implementing our protocol. The functions bitwise xor (⊕), bitwise or (∨) are imple-
mented with m (the word length) logic gates. For implementing the add with carry circuit, 
a parallel architecture is proposed. Six logic gates are needed for each bit added in paral-
lel.2 A gate count of 8 has been chosen for implementing a flip-flop as in [17]. Addition-
ally, 30% of logic gates are considered for control functions. 
Table 13. Proposed architectures features. 
Word length 8-bit 16-bit 32-bit 96-bit 
ALU 64 128 256 7350 
Control 22 43 86 8400 N. of 
Total 86 171 342 8120 
N. of clock cycles (@100KHz) 2194 1402 706 10868 
Answers/second 46 71 142 8100 
 
 
2 Add one bit with carry: S = A ⊕ [B ⊕ CENT], CSAL = BCENT + ACENT + AB. 
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Table 14. Core comparison of hash functions. 
 Hash output size (bits) 
Cycles per 
block  
Throughput at 
100 KHz (Kbps) Area GE 
MD4 128 456 28 7350 
MD5 128 612 20.9 8400 
SHA-1 160 1274 12.55 8120 
SHA-256 256 1128 22.7 10868 
NAME 256 96 266.67 8100 
 
As we can see in Table 13, in the best case (m = 8) the protocol only needs around 
100 gates. In Table 14, we also show the number of logical gates needed for implement-
ing various hash functions. The best implementation of traditional hash functions such as 
MD5 or SHA needs more than 8K gates which is far higher than the capabilities of low- 
cost RFID tags [14]. Additionally, there is also a proposal of an implementation of a new 
universal hash function for ultra low-power cryptographic hardware applications [58]. 
Although this solution only needs around 1.7K gates, a deeper security analysis of it is 
necessary and has not yet been accomplished. Furthermore, this function only has a 
64-bit output, which does not guarantee an appropriate security level because finding 
collisions is a relatively easy task due to the birthday paradox (around 232 operations). 
Finally, although we have not yet implemented the circuit physically, due to the 
known fact that power consumption and circuit area are proportional to the number of 
logical gates, it seems that our implementation will be suitable even for very low-cost 
RFID tags. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite the common usage of hash functions in theoretical proposals to secure 
RFID systems, its implementation is well beyond the current capabilities of these devices. 
Moreover, the use of hash functions has not been included in the Gen-2 specification. 
Since the publication and later ratification of the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 specifi-
cation, its security has been deeply analyzed. After a detailed examination, important 
security pitfalls have been discovered. For example, the EPC is transmitted in plain text, 
which implies privacy and spoofing problems. Moreover, tracking could be done in a 
very straightforward way, since EPC is fixed. Some authors have proposed new solutions 
in order to solve some of these problems [6, 24, 27, 28, 37]. However, the protocols pre-
sented so far still present security weaknesses. For this reason we propose a new ultra 
light authentication protocol, named ULAP. 
As it has been ratified by the Gen-2 specification, only simple operations are sup-
ported on-chip on the tag. Moreover, we consider 4K gates as the maximum number of 
gates that can be devoted to security [44]. Taking into account these two considerations, 
the following operations are used in the protocol: bitwise xor (⊕), bitwise or (∨), and 
sum mod 2m (+). Tag memory has been extended to store the key, index-pseudonym, and 
SessionIDS. This use fits well with Gen-2 specification, where memory size is unlimited. 
The first two phases of our protocol (tag-identification and reader-authentication) will be 
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equivalent to the inventory tag operation described in the Gen-2 specification [11], but 
correct its security problems. 
In spite of demanding very few resources, the main security aspects of RFID sys-
tems (privacy, tracking) have been addressed efficiently. As shown in Table 11, ULAP 
improves on many of the hash-based solutions proposed so far, in many aspects. So, 
ULAP is not only able to avoid privacy and tracking-related problems, but it is also re-
sistant to forgery, replay attacks, etc. 
Finally, another paramount characteristic in our scheme is efficiency: tag identifica-
tion by a valid reader does not require exhaustive search in the back-end database, al-
lowing for an easy scalability of our scheme to RFID systems with huge numbers of tags. 
Furthermore, only two messages need to be exchanged in the identification stage and 
another two in the mutual authentication stage, keeping the communication overhead to a 
minimum. The same number of messages are used in the inventory tag population de-
scribed in the Gen-2 specification. So our protocol does not alter the framework of the 
EPC Class-1 Generation-2. In conclusion, ULAP is a fully EPC Gen-2 compliant proto-
col. 
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